老來大徹大悟、覺今是而昨非的白邦瑞(Michael Pillsbury)主張促發中國顏色革命
一
常來台灣建州運動臉書網頁訪問的鄉親與朋友們對白邦瑞不會陌生，因為我們過去常提到他。
我們過去至少已有兩次寫文章介紹白邦瑞:
(1)「白邦瑞的新著: 一本必須被台灣人美國人與日本人熟讀的大作」
(1/31/2015張貼);
(2)「老共欺騙美國，美國歷任總統竟會被或竟甘被老共『欺騙』，這真是匪夷所思」(3/15/2015張貼)
我們今天重貼「老共欺騙美國，美國歷任總統竟會被或竟甘被老共『欺騙』，這真是匪夷所思」，把它放在附錄中，請大家先去閱讀它(附錄乙)。
二
我們今天要跟大家介紹一篇文章，我們也把它放在附錄中，有興趣的朋友請到那裡去閱讀全文，在這裡我們只準備把該文的其中一段摘錄出來，我並為不習慣閱讀英文的朋友們翻譯:
//Nonetheless, in a surprise move, Pillsbury does not call for a new era of Cold-War style containment. “There is no global ideological struggle, no need to create an anti-China alliance akin to the NATO alliance to contain an expanding empire.” Instead, America should revive “the support for democracy and civil society groups within China.” Pillsbury laments that the U.S. spends only $50 million on democracy promotion in China annually, and thinks America should build domestic and international organizations, “a grand coalition” to bring “change to China.” In particular, the U.S. should focus on ending any technical or bureaucratic aid it provides China, fighting “anti-American competitive conduct,” exposing censorship, and seeking to maintain America’s military and economic superiority. The way to avoid the China nightmare of 2049, apparently, is to forge a strategy for competition and match China on its own terms.// [白邦瑞並沒有呼籲或主張要對中國採取過去對付蘇聯的冷戰型態的圍堵，他主張美國應該重啟在中國境內支持民主與公民社會團體的政策。白邦瑞對美國每年只提撥五千萬美元的預算做為在中國境內促進民主一事悲嘆，他認為，美國應該建立國內與國際組織，以及建立一個「大聯盟」，以便為中國帶來變革。]
建州運動對白邦瑞的看法與主張完全贊同: 對中國最好採取協助它發生顏色革命的策略，這也是老共聞之色變與喪膽的好策略。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted to making Taiwan a state of the United States)
=====================================================
附錄甲
In his new book, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (St Martin’s Griffin Edition: March 2016), Michael Pillsbury, a long-time Pentagon insider, reveals—for the first time ever—China’s historically unprecedented strategy to become an independent, strong, prosperous, and respected global power. Not content to be an undeveloped nation of poor peasants and menial factory workers, the Chinese have a secret plan to make their nation “the greatest power in the world,” Pillsbury explains. No longer willing to passively accept the shame of being a divided nation exploited by its neighbors, China—Pillsbury argues breathtakingly—has a coherent (and secret!) economic, political, and military plan to make China great again.
What is so shocking about this secret plan is that it belies the expectations of the Washington, D.C. intelligentsia. “We believed,” Pillsbury explains, “that American aid to a fragile China whose leaders thought like us would help China become a democratic and peaceful power without ambitions of regional or even global dominance.” U.S. engagement with China, which Pillsbury himself helped promote during his many decades as the Defense Department’s go-to China expert, was supposed to bring “complete cooperation” and “permanent” friendship between the two great nations. That was why America was willing to accept rapprochement with China during the Nixon Administration. But gradually Pillsbury, mostly alone among the nation’s China experts, came to see the light: the Chinese “had deceived me and the American government.” China was supposed to meekly rise into someone else’s order. China and America were to “become true allies forever.” Instead, having initiated rapprochement in 1969, China used American scientific, military, and business know-how to craftily strengthen itself for a long-term competition. The Soviet Union was only a passing meteor in this struggle for greatness—surpassing the U.S. was always China’s true ambition.
Pillsbury’s book reveals this mendacious Chinese plot, and points out where America went wrong. Rapprochement with China during the Cold War he rates as tolerably strategic: after all, it was useful to have China on America’s side. Where the U.S. really went wrong was at Tiananmen. It was then that it became clear that “the winds of democracy” had all but ceased to blow, and certainly were not “creating new hope,” as President George Herbert Walker Bush had remarked in February 1989. Instead of preserving its increasingly positive relationship with China after June 4, 1989, the U.S. should have supported “the Chinese exiles in Paris” and forced China to privatize its SOEs, even though (as Pillsbury himself admits) there was simply not enough money in the Chinese economy to purchase these state assets and (again, as Pillsbury admits) all the other Asian Tigers developed their economies initially with state supported enterprises.
But America did not act, in Pillsbury’s telling, and so China’s anti-democratic turn picked up speed. It was after the Tiananmen crackdown that the Chinese patriotic education campaign kicked off, poisoning the minds of Chinese youth and spreading lies about America’s past history. This Chinese “hypernationalism” was activated by China’s leaders in 1999 when the U.S. bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade, killing three. In response, China’s leaders seemed to believe their own propaganda. As the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission declared in 2002, they believed “that the fundamental drive of the United States is to maintain global hegemony by engaging in the shameless pursuit of ‘power politics,’ often disguised as a quest for democratization.” For the Chinese, America had now become, says Pillsbury, “the great Satan.”
This belief, mixed with China’s own “psychological peculiarities,” produced a set of fears in China: namely, that America had a war plan to blockade China (it did not help that a former Japanese naval chief of staff said that the U.S. and Japan would, in a contingency, contain Chinese forces within the First Island Chain), that America would exploit China’s weakness in its near seas, threaten China’s sea lines of communication, and encourage rebels and terrorism inside China. The way for China to deal with the great Satan and these dangerous strategies, Pillsbury explains, is the Assassin’s Mace—a secret weapon called shashoujian in Chinese. This weapon, following the lessons of ancient Chinese strategy, will target America where it is weak by developing asymmetric capabilities that today go by the name A2/AD (Anti-Access Area Denial).
So what if China succeeds? What if it realizes its China Dream 2049? The answer, Pillsbury says, is simple: “many websites will be filled with rewritten history defaming the West and praising China; and pollution will contaminate the air in more countries . . . in a race to the bottom in food safety and environmental standards. . . . species could disappear, ocean levels will rise, and cancer will spread. . . . Chinese state-owned monopolies will dominate the global marketplace, and one of the world’s mightiest military alliances may be controlled by Beijing.” Unless America intervenes and makes China pay a price “for its behavior,” this is the future we all should look forward to.
Nonetheless, in a surprise move, Pillsbury does not call for a new era of Cold-War style containment. “There is no global ideological struggle, no need to create an anti-China alliance akin to the NATO alliance to contain an expanding empire.” Instead, America should revive “the support for democracy and civil society groups within China.” Pillsbury laments that the U.S. spends only $50 million on democracy promotion in China annually, and thinks America should build domestic and international organizations, “a grand coalition” to bring “change to China.” In particular, the U.S. should focus on ending any technical or bureaucratic aid it provides China, fighting “anti-American competitive conduct,” exposing censorship, and seeking to maintain America’s military and economic superiority.
The way to avoid the China nightmare of 2049, apparently, is to forge a strategy for competition and match China on its own terms.
Now, if you happen to disagree with Pillsbury’s narrative, it’s probably because you’ve been duped by Chinese propaganda, influenced by the money your institution receives from the Chinese government, or even more basically, you do not understand the lessons of China’s Warring States period. (Happily for Pillsbury, paid employees of the U.S. Defense Department have no such biases.) As a disbeliever, you are members of the “Red Team.” You are a “good assistant” and perform an important public relations role for the Chinese government, but in fact you are perpetuating the deception foisted on America by China’s devious leaders. So please, dear reader, bear this in mind as you weigh the words that follow.
Much could be said of Pillsbury’s arguments, but perhaps it is enough to make four points.
First, in the annals of history you will find nothing particularly Chinese in the desire for a nation to become independent, prosperous, and powerful—in a word, great (or even, the greatest). In the ancient Greek world, polities competed for honor (timē) by telling glorious stories about their past and winning victories in battle. The polity that could do these things the best became the hegemon—the legitimate authority. In East Asia, of course, China historically filled this role, until, that is, civil war and western imperialism led to a hundred years of humiliation. Modern European history has been one of unremitting competition between states, and many historians have viewed it as a constant succession of hegemonies (e.g., Portugal to Holland to Britain to America). The most peaceful period of this history—the long-nineteenth century (1815-1914)—occurred when Europe’s five major powers recognized one another as “great” andlimited the competition in important ways. Today Marco Rubio seeks to create a “New American Century.” Donald Trump declares he will “Make America Great Again!” Is it really such a secret that other nations—China, yes, but also Russia and even Brazil—seek greatness as well? The answer of course is no, and that unceremoniously deflates the entire premise of Pillsbury’s book.
Second, the idea that China would become a sort of American lackey, democratic and free—America’s “permanent” friend—would be laughable, except for the fact that Pillsbury and many others in the American policy community seemed to have in fact believed it. Nothing short of ignorance and naiveté can explain such a belief. The Sino-American rapprochement was from the beginning rooted in the interests of both nations, not their identities. China needed rapprochement because of the imminent threat of the Soviet Union; America needed rapprochement in order to end the Vietnam War with some semblance of honor. This was IR 101: two states balancing against a third, which posed a threat to both. But forget academic theories—Pillsbury could have just read Isaac Asimov’s Foundation and Empire, in which the Foundation and the independent trading worlds, theretofore rivals, join together to oppose a rising power threatening both of them (“the Mule”). There is no mystery here, and no speculation on China’s supposed culture of deception is necessary to explain the Sino-American alliance. After the USSR collapsed, a benign threat environment, Deng’s societal transformation, and increasing trade and personal contact sustained the relationship. China and America, in this new era, would cooperate where their interests conjoined and compete where they differed. There was no end of history here and no democratic convergence, though these liberal nostrums seem to have deceived Pillsbury and the Washington, D.C. elite.
Third, Pillsbury’s description of his 2049 China Nightmare takes every negative trend and aspect of Chinese society and simply projects it forward thirty years. This is a picture perfect example of the “linear projection fallacy.” Since China is polluted today, it (and its trading partners) will be even worse in the future; since Chinese individuals steal intellectual property (IP) today, they will steal even more in the future; since China has aided “rogue states” in the past, it will do so to an even greater extent in the future, etc. This argument is stunningly irresponsible. Industrialization is a process. Industrializing states (including the U.S.) have historically stolen other nations’ IP, polluted the environment, and permitted terrible working conditions for workers. As states grow richer they begin to care more about IP (because they are creating it), to pay more attention to the environment (once you are not dying from malnourishment, you can start worrying about air quality), to reform their labor and trade policies (because of domestic pressures), and to worry more about global instability (because of close trade dependencies). This process is occurring in China today.
Here’s the proof: in terms of pollution, 2015 was the cleanest year in Beijing since numbers were first recorded in 2008, and pollution fell by around 15 percent in scores of other cities. In fact, today it is not authoritarian China but democratic India that has the world’s most polluted cities, a fact Pillsbury seems blissfully (and conveniently) unaware of. In 2014, the Chinese Government declared “war on pollution” and Premier Li Keqiang pledged to shut down coal-fired factories and power plants. He has kept his promise: in 2016 alone, 1,000 coal mines will be shut down, and coal-burning power generation is projected to drop annually by 2-4 percent. When I lived in Beijing last year, Chinese students regularly told me that the environment was the most important issue to them (“environmental studies” is an increasingly popular degree, unsurprisingly). The government understands this. Cleaning up the environment has become a legitimacy issue for the CCP, and the trend of the future is not coal burning and steel manufacturing but clean solar energy, high-tech infrastructure, and professional services. Similar points could be made about labor reforms and China’s support for global order, but I digress.
Finally, even if you believe everything Pillsbury says about the 2049 China Nightmare, you should recognize that his “solution” is inadequate. If China really is a rising giant that—by just 2030—will have half the per-capita GDP of the U.S. and twice the overall GDP by Justin Yifu Lin’s projections, how will reduced U.S.-China cooperation (which Pillsbury recommends) and increased American competitiveness change anything in the long term? Pillsbury understands the trend of China’s rise, and so instead he places his hope in America’s ability to influence China’s domestic politics. But to “support prodemocracy reformers” as Pillsbury recommends, would reinforce China’s paranoia, not reassure it. As he says himself, Chinese leaders view such interference as aimed at dividing and weakening the Chinese state. The logical response to such U.S. interference is bolstered authoritarianism, the very thing Pillsbury seems to decry. Perhaps, though, this is what he would like to see happen, as increased authoritarianism would hamper Chinese economic growth and intensify popular disquiet. Two can play the game of deception.
All this being said, Pillsbury is right about one point that deserves great emphasis. Though a “hawk” himself, he decries other anti-China hawks who speak loosely about China’s desire to “dominate” its region through offensive military force. There is simply no evidence in Chinese sources for such a view, though this would surprise Filipino president Benigno Aquino: “No serious Chinese scholar advocates the approach to conquest of Hitler or Stalin or Tojo. No ying pai hawk author ever raises a strategy of territorial expansion or global ideological domination.” A bid to become a great power is not the same as a bid to seek “domination” through conquest, a point all too frequently forgotten by China’s critics.
Liu Mingfu has a China Dream. Michael Pillsbury has a China Nightmare. The Dream is for China to become a powerful global leader that assumes its rightful place in the world as a respected and prestigious nation. The Nightmare is that China achieves this and then imposes its values on the world. Pillsbury hopes that as China grows, its values will evolve towards openness, but because he thinks the CCP has already fooled him once in this regard, he thinks America needs to lead a coalition that somehow forces domestic reform in China. The fears and paranoia of Chinese society make such an outcome fanciful. America’s goal should be, above all, to maintain peaceful relations with China. America’s hope should be that peace will grow into trust and trust into friendship. Among great powers in a nuclear world, a friend can pull harder than an enemy can push.
附錄乙
老共欺騙美國，美國歷任總統竟會被或竟甘被老共「欺騙」，這真是匪夷所思
(3/15/2015張貼)
一
台灣建州運動於1/30/2015張貼了「白邦瑞的新著: 一本必須被台灣人、美國人與日本人熟讀的大作」一文。該文部分內容如下:
//------我平常最喜歡讀美國國防部顧問白邦瑞(Dr. Michael Pillsbury)與Australian National University的榮譽教授Dr. Paul Dibb所寫的文章或報告，他們兩位都是軍事與安全領域的專家，而且都對老共的霸權圖謀了解極深，同時都對老共的擴張野心保持高度警惕，如果西方國家的戰略家、軍事家與國安事務專家學者都有他們這樣的學養、認識、態度與立場，那我們台灣人今天的處境肯定不會像現在這麼糟糕與危殆。
白邦瑞是西方世界中對共軍(包括軍務與戰略)及中共有很深入的研究並對它們的了解極深的極少數人士之一，他的研究素材是五角大廈的軍情局從老共那裡收集到的權威資料與刊物，包括老共列為內參的機密文件與報告，他對這些權威而難得的寶貴素材進行研究與分析，得出一個很準確的結論: 反美的老共早已秘密制訂要取代美國做為世界霸權的戰略，並且早已在執行該項戰略。
很可惜，一般美國民眾都不知道老共反美，也不知老共有亟欲成為世界霸權的不軌圖謀。
為什麼會這樣?那是CIA的高層刻意對美國民眾進行隱瞞的結果。CIA的高層認為，若老共高層反美的言論被揭發，只會激怒美國的保守派及捍衛人權的左翼份子，因而將傷害美中關係。
白邦瑞說: 多數美國官員忽視老共所有的反美徵象，有些反美的證據甚至被壓掉。
不讓美國人民知道老共與中國人的帝國圖謀，這是何等地嚴重。
白邦瑞把這些事情寫成一本書，書名叫”The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower” (百年的馬拉松競賽: 中國欲取代美國做為新的世界霸權的秘密戰略)。//[重貼或引述結束]
二
白邦瑞雖然在早期是「熊貓的擁抱者」，但其實他在與老共密切互動以及深入研究中國一段時間之後，就已掌握了老共與中國帝國主義者的霸權圖謀，只不過他可能是出於想繼續對中國進行近距離的觀察與取得第一手的研究資料的考量或出於「不入虎穴，焉得虎子」的策略性考慮，所以他一直都沒有很公開地揭發老共與中國帝國主義者的狼子野心。
現在白邦瑞完全豁出去，與老共與中國帝國主義者完全撕破臉，雖然稍嫌晚了些，但總比美國那些死不悔改的「熊貓擁抱者」(親中派)、對中調適派、對中姑息派、對中妥協派與「拒絕將中國定位為敵人派」來得有勇氣與骨氣，並來得高明。
對老共與中國帝國主義者的擴張本質與霸權圖謀看得最透徹的是台灣的建州派與美國的新保守派，我們從1990年代的上半期(1989年六四天安門鎮壓與屠殺之後)開始，就對老共與中國帝國主義者定了性[我們把他們定性為走國家資本主義、裙帶資本主義、國家恐怖主義與擴張主義的中國版納粹]，並對「中國威脅論」展開第一波的文宣攻勢，這一波攻勢在2001年9月11日阿拉伯基地恐怖組織與阿富汗塔利班恐怖主義政壇對美國本土發動攻擊之後，被迫中止，這讓美國喪失了及早集中資源與精力對付企圖挑戰美國的世界領導權的中國帝國主義者的幾年寶貴時間，也給了中國帝國主義者坐大的機會。[台灣的建州派與美國國安外交界的有識之士在中國國防大學教授劉明福大校於2010年被中國官方核准出版「中國夢」一書之後，就對中共與中國人的邪惡的霸權圖謀的認定完全確立，這本「中國夢」就是中國帝國主義者要稱霸世界的路徑圖，猶如希特勒出版「我的奮鬥」一樣。]
現在的歐巴馬政府宣示「重返亞洲」，美國的新保守派也已有對老共與中國帝國主義者展開第二波文宣反擊的態勢，建州運動因而期望美國採取「西守東攻」的戰略，也期望美國不再在包括中東與東歐在內的地區進行地面作戰，我們希望華府信守將60%的海軍兵力及40%的空軍武力調到亞太地區進行前進佈署的計劃與承諾。
三
白邦瑞大約在十年前以來，就在某些情況或場合中，特別是在給國防部的一些報告中，就很清楚地指出中國對美國與自由世界的威脅，老共對這種情況當然也有些掌握[老共也不是省油的燈，他們以前就吸收美國National Defense University(國防大學)的Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs(中國軍事事務研究中心)的主任做他們的間諜]，我們現在就請鄉親們來讀中共的喉舌所登載的一篇文章。
「一到中國就說『友好』，一回美國就談『威脅』，五角大樓顧問白邦瑞杜撰中美大戰」
人民日報人民網特约記者 葉德淵
《环球人物》 ( 2006-12-16 第二十期 )
//白邦瑞，美国国防部长办公室政策研究室高级顾问。笔者第一次见到白邦瑞，是在苏州举行的第五届《孙子兵法》国际研讨会上。他看起来是一个乐呵呵的老头，蓝眼睛灰头发，说一口流利的普通话，很喜欢和中方学者搭讪。他自称已参加过4届《孙子兵法》研讨会，与主办会议的中国军事科学院的不少学者都认识。
但是，那些和他“认识”的中方学者，对他却少有热情。一位学者在闲聊时这样评价白邦瑞：“他一到中国就说‘友好’，一回美国就谈‘威胁’。”
研究中国30多年，曾主张“联中抗苏”
白邦瑞的全名是米切尔•皮尔斯伯里，1945年出生于一个富商家族，家族旗下的“皮尔斯伯里食品公司”是拥有百年历史的老字号。白邦瑞5岁时随父母定居旧金山，那里的唐人街留给他的第一印象是：中餐馆和逃难而来的中国移民。
白邦瑞高中毕业后，父母原本希望他报考商业贸易专业，以便日后接管家族企业。但他却考入了斯坦福大学学习中国历史。随后，他去了台湾，在台湾大学的斯坦福中心学了两年汉语。后来，白邦瑞回到美国哥伦比亚大学，师从美国前总统国家安全事务助理布热津斯基，攻读政治学博士学位。
当时，中美关系正处于一个特殊的时期。1972年2月21日，尼克松总统的专机降落在北京，中美关系翻开了新的一页。几个月后，白邦瑞进入著名的智囊机构——兰德公司，从事中美关系研究。嗅觉敏锐的他意识到，形势出现了变化。后来，他发表了一篇文章，主张美国应该“联中抗苏”，开展与中国的军事合作。
白邦瑞的文章受到当时的国务卿基辛格等人的重视。后来，当选总统的里根还专门写信与他探讨这一问题。由此，这个年轻的博士一跃而进入制定美国外交政策的核心圈子，基辛格甚至授意国务院建立“白邦瑞渠道”，让他去纽约会见中国常驻联合国代表团，秘密与中方讨论两国军事合作事宜。实际上，白邦瑞能提出这样的观点，和他的导师布热津斯基有很大关系。布热津斯基主张美国与中国发展关系，共同遏制苏联，在出任卡特的总统国家安全事务助理后，极力建议美国与中国实现关系正常化。
白邦瑞对这段历史颇为自豪：“当时，我作为一名年轻学者，第一个在美国提出与中国人民解放军建立军事交流关系。这个建议被美国最高当局采纳，成为一项既定国策，并延续至今”。但苏联解体后，他却来了个180度的大转弯，成了一个“中国军事威胁论”的鼓吹者。
说“韬光养晦”是“卧薪尝胆”
1991年海湾战争之后，中国提出要推动军队的现代化建设。也就是从这个时候开始，白邦瑞摇身一变，开始大肆鼓吹“中国军事威胁论”。
来自五角大楼的传言称，白邦瑞熟读《孙子兵法》，能够“用中国的思维思考中国”。白邦瑞自己也说过：“三天不学（《孙子兵法》）没法活。”
但是，令人想不到的是，白邦瑞居然从《孙子兵法》里看出了“中国威胁论”。他曾向中方学者提到一个细节：他和五角大楼的搭档们研究《孙子兵法》和中国古代谋略时，看到了越王勾践“卧薪尝胆”的计谋，受到很大触动。白邦瑞后来多次用这个故事来影射中美关系，称中国的“韬光养晦”政策是“卧薪尝胆”的现代版，如果不遏制中国，30年后，美国也会像吴王夫差一样被杀掉。
被美国学者讽为“都是一派胡言”
在拉姆斯菲尔德入主五角大楼以后，白邦瑞出尽了风头。据美国媒体披露，在五角大楼讨论中国政策的会议上，白邦瑞总是被安排坐在拉姆斯菲尔德的身边。白邦瑞为何如此受器重？美国媒体认为，那是因为，白邦瑞摸准了拉氏的脉搏，他献上的“中国威胁论”，正合“鹰派”的胃口。
近年来，美国兴起了研究中国军事问题的热潮。有人认为，中国的崛起将深刻影响亚太地区的安全格局，而美国对中国的战略走向却看不清楚。在这种背景下，美国高层不断举行听证会，研讨中国军事发展动态。这刺激了情报部门和研究机构，使中国军事问题研究成为“热门学科”，不少美国学者因此一夜成名。
嗅觉敏锐的白邦瑞马上觉察到了这个动向，在一次听证会上，他发言的开场白是：“所有美国人都看错了中国！”这句话马上吸引了在座所有人的注意。接着，白邦瑞摸出一本书——《中国如何看待未来战争》。这是他借学术交流的机会，搜集到中国军方研究人员发表的600余篇学术文章，装了几大箱运回美国，从中摘选编译，再加上他的“点评”后出的一本书。在这本书里，白邦瑞发挥出超人的想象力，把中国学者对军事学术的探讨演绎成针对美国的战争计划，并以此为蓝本，描绘出一幅十分恐怖的中美大战的未来画面。
这幅画面让五角大楼里的“鹰派”人物又惊又喜，他们正愁自己看不懂中文，找不到如此合适的“证据”。五角大楼甚至有人这样评价白邦瑞：“麦克（白邦瑞的昵称）的眼睛能钻进中国军人的内心深处。”曾任美国驻华大使的李洁明说得更为通俗：“他总是能举出诱人的例子，证明中国正在发展要打沉美国航空母舰的潜艇，或者正在发明要打击美国卫星的导弹。”
白邦瑞的言辞，迎合了某些“鹰派”势力的政治需要。因此，一下子成了五角大楼里的“红人”。2005年美国国防部《中国军力报告》就是由他主笔的，其中很煽情地鼓吹“中国威胁论”。结果，报告还没出台，就遭到强烈质疑，被迫几易其稿，发布时间一再推迟。 许多研究中国问题的美国学者对此看得很透，认为白邦瑞也是在搞学术投机，甚至嘲讽他是“机会主义者”。五角大楼新一代智囊的代表人物之一、海军战争学院教授伯奈特曾说，在中国问题上，白邦瑞是“博”（读过不少书），前副国务卿佐利克才是“通”（了解问题的精髓所在）。伯奈特还挖苦白邦瑞说：“对于麦克那些吹毛求疵的言论，我的回答是……那基本上都是一派胡言。”
遭中国学者当面质问
白邦瑞主笔的2005年美国国防部《中国军力报告》出台后，很多中方学者因为反感他极力鼓吹“中国威胁论”，不愿再搭理他，2006年在杭州举行的《孙子兵法》研讨会也没邀请他。这让白邦瑞感到很是失落。后来，他找了个借口跑到北京，到处找关系，一定要和中方学者“交流”。一位中方学者当面质问他：“你多次在美国国会作证，鼓吹‘中国威胁论’，讲了很多不利于中美关系的话，到底是何用意？”
白邦瑞一听也急了，忙辩解说：“你不要误解我！不要把‘蓝队’的标签贴在我头上，我从来不敢反对‘一个中国’——1974年中美双方谈判，确认一个中国原则时，在场的美方代表除了基辛格，另外两个人就是老布什和拉姆斯菲尔德。谁要是在华盛顿说反对一个中国原则，谁就是反对拉姆斯菲尔德和布什总统的父亲。”// [文章結束]
四
為了讓不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親們能對白邦瑞與其新著更加了解，我們現在轉貼兩篇報導，其中一篇來自中共在台灣經營的匪報。
甲: 「美前官員指陸有百年欺美戰略，白邦瑞新書披露，由毛澤東發起，企圖取代美成世界霸主」
旺報2/4/2015
//美國國防政策顧問、哈德遜研究中心中國戰略研究主任，前美國助理副國務卿（雷根政府時期）白邦瑞（Michael Pillsbury）近日於其新書《百年馬拉松》披露，大陸有一項針對美國、長達百年的現代化「戰略欺騙計畫」（Strategic Deception Program），對美國歷屆政府進行欺騙，企圖最後由中共主導的共產主義體系替代美國主導的世界秩序；這項祕密計畫直至今日都還在進行，而此一計畫正是由毛澤東所發起。
美國網媒「華盛頓自由燈塔」引述白邦瑞的著作指出，超過40年，大陸領導人一直欺騙著美國總統、國務卿和美國政府的分析人士與決策者，使其錯誤地評估認為，「大陸是一個值得美國支持的良性強權」。
超級鷹派執行此戰略
白邦瑞在書中總結稱，這一起源於中國古代治國藝術的戰略，目的在於讓美國大範圍轉移大量的資金、技術和專業知識給大陸，並轉化為支持解放軍和共產主義的養分；而大陸官方內部的「超級鷹派」份子目前也正在忠實執行這一戰略，直至有一天能迎頭趕上、甚至超越美國。
裝弱取得美提供物資
白邦瑞稱，「戰略欺騙計畫」於1955年由毛澤東親自啟動，刻意在世界上廣泛傳播中國是一個窮困、落後、不關心外界的國家，使美國認為必須幫助中國，向中國提供各類物資，能有助與中國維持友好關係，但這全錯了！
他指出，大陸這一「百年欺騙戰略」另一目標是旨在獲得全球經濟的主導地位，而其軍事建設只是其中的一部分，最後將經濟，政治和軍事實力合併，成為新的全球霸主；而後就會將其反民主的政治制度和經濟體治「出口」到全世界。
白邦瑞新書中包含的新細節是美聯邦調查局、中央情報局和國防部批准出版，其中包括之前保密的美國總統指示、大陸叛逃美國人員的證詞和大陸鷹派軍事政治領導人的著作中所散發出的警告細節。
乙: 「百年取代美國，中國機密戰略曝光」
世界日報 編譯中心／綜合2日電
2015-02-04
//中國制訂了一項百年現代化的機密戰略計畫，試圖蒙蔽美國政府，不知不覺地幫助中國實現其宏偉戰略目標。五角大廈長期研究中國的專家白邦瑞(Michael Pillsbury)在本周出版的新書「百年馬拉松」中指出，中國的長遠戰略目標，就是用中國的經濟和政治制度取代美國領導的世界秩序。
白邦瑞的中文流利，現任哈德遜研究所的中國戰略研究中心主任，自尼克森總統以來，就為歷屆美國總統提供中國政策與情報的分析報告。華盛頓自由燈塔報報導，白邦瑞說，中國領導人過去40年故意讓美國總統和高官對中國做出誤判，以為中國是離不開美國支持的友邦。但中國戰略的宗旨是占據全球經濟的主導地位，軍事發展只是其長期戰略的一部分，中國需要全面施展經濟、政治和軍事實力，才能實現全球霸權，輸出中國式的反民主制度和掠奪型的經濟模式。
白邦瑞的新作在聯邦調查局、中央情報局和國防部審查後，獲准出版，書中有已經解密的美國總統命令、中國叛逃者的證詞，和中國軍方與政界鷹派的論述，但敏感部分在審查時被刪除。
中國在天安門鎮壓發生後，受到許多西方國家制裁，但中國政府1990年代末每年在美國發動有效的遊說，以促使國會批准中國的最惠國貿易待遇。而中國的幕後遊說成功，美國做出了戰略性的重大貿易讓步。
書中舉例說，美國1970年代初實行的與中國接觸政策，其實不是尼克森總統當時的國家安全顧問季辛吉首先提出，而是中國軍方高層的建議，主要是為了對蘇聯打美國牌，以防中國被莫斯科吞併。白邦瑞也承認，為防中國被併入蘇聯的勢力範圍，當年他也強烈主張與中國的建設性接觸。
他表示，1989年六四事件後，他開始逐步放棄親近中國的主張。他說，原以為美國的援助可幫助中國實現民主，成為沒有地區和全球野心的和平力量，但這種看法不但錯誤，而且危險。白邦瑞表示，他的書就是向中國發出明確訊息：「美國已察覺到你們的戰略目的」。//
五
美國新保守派裡頭有幾位很權威的軍事家戰略家與國防專家，也有消息靈通、報導非常權威的媒體軍事記者，建州派由於很注意他們的報導、評論與報告，所以我們在這些領域的訊息比較靈通，或者掌握某些訊息比較快。
我們現在把在美國新保守派所經營的刊物刊登的兩篇介紹白邦瑞及其近著的文章張貼在下面，做為附錄，讓習慣以英文為思考的工具的鄉親能有機會閱讀，我們另外又把在華爾街日報上出現的一篇書評也貼上，做為附錄三，這一篇也很有參考價值。
下一次我們再度介紹白邦瑞及他的新作時，我們將直接引述該書的精彩部分。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
附錄一
“Book: CIA Concealed 'Anti-U.S.' Tirades By Chinese Leaders From American Public”
BY DANIEL HALPER
WEEKLYSTANDARD.COMJAN 30, 2015
A new book set to be released next week alleges that the CIA took steps to prevent anti-American tirades from Chinese Communist officials from being heard in America. The details are revealed in Michael Pillsbury's The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, which will be released next week.
"Most American officials ignored the anti-American signs altogether. Some of the anti-U.S. evidence was even suppressed," Pillsbury writes.
On a routine visit in the 1990s to the CIA translation center in Reston, Virginia, I asked a translator why so few examples of Chinese leaders’ anti-American tirades appeared in its reports.
Almost all U.S. officials relied on translations from the center to follow what was on the Chinese leadership’s mind, because so few can actually read—and grasp the many crucial nuances of—the Chinese language.
“That’s easy,” she replied. “I have instructions not to translate nationalistic stuff.”
I was puzzled by this. “Why?” I asked her.
“The China division at headquarters told me it would just inflame both the conservatives and left-wing human rights advocates here in Washington and hurt relations with China.”
Pillsbury, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, "was the Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and responsible for implementation of the program of covert aid known as the Reagan Doctrine," according to his biography.
附錄二
China’s Secret Strategy Exposed
Beijing Plots to Surpass U.S. in Coming Decades
BY: Bill Gertz
February 2, 2015 5:00 am
http://freebeacon.com/natio…/chinas-secret-strategy-exposed/
China launched a secret 100-year modernization program that deceived successive U.S. administrations into unknowingly promoting Beijing’s strategy of replacing the U.S.-led world order with a Chinese communist-dominated economic and political system, according to a new book by a longtime Pentagon China specialist.
For more than four decades, Chinese leaders lulled presidents, cabinet secretaries, and other government analysts and policymakers into falsely assessing China as a benign power deserving of U.S. support, says Michael Pillsbury, the Mandarin-speaking analyst who has worked on China policy and intelligence issues for every U.S. administration since Richard Nixon.
The secret strategy, based on ancient Chinese statecraft, produced a large-scale transfer of cash, technology, and expertise that bolstered military and Communist Party “superhawks” in China who are now taking steps to catch up to and ultimately surpass the United States, Pillsbury concludes in a book published this week.
The Chinese strategic deception program was launched by Mao Zedong in 1955 and put forth the widespread misbelief that China is a poor, backward, inward-looking country. “And therefore the United States has to help them, and give away things to them, to make sure they stay friendly,” Pillsbury said in an interview. “This is totally wrong.”
The Chinese strategy also is aimed at gaining global economic dominance, he says, noting that China’s military buildup is but one part. The combined economic, political, and military power is seeking to produce China as a new global “hegemon” that will export its anti-democratic political system and predatory economic practices around the world.
In the interview, Pillsbury, currently director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Chinese Strategy, said new details contained in the book were cleared for publication by the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department, including details of formerly classified presidential directives, testimony from previously unknown Chinese defectors, and alarming details of writings from powerful Chinese military and political hawks.
The book also discloses for the first time that the opening to China in 1969 and 1970, considered one of the United States’ most significant strategic gambits, was not initiated by then-President Nixon’s top national security aide Henry Kissinger. Instead, Pillsbury shows that it was Chinese generals who played the United States card against the Soviet Union, amid fears of a takeover of the country by Moscow.
Some sensitive details were removed from the manuscript by the government. However, the totality of the book represents an authorized disclosure of China’s secret strategy that is among the most significant releases of internal U.S. government information in over a decade, Pillsbury said.
“That highlights the importance of the book,” Pillsbury said in an interview. “And it sends a message to China: We’re not as clueless as you think.”
Pillsbury also reveals how a Chinese government defector exposed Beijing’s effective lobbying campaign from 1995 to 2000 that led Congress to approve Most-Favored National trade status for China—several years after China was sanctioned for the bloody massacre by the military of unarmed protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.
The covert influence operation was carried out at a time when American concerns about Chinese human rights violations were high. Yet China was able to successfully induce U.S. leaders into making key strategic trade concessions.
That covert influence program was revealed by one of the six Chinese defectors Pillsbury questioned over the years, including one who turned out to be a false defector—FBI informant Katrina Leung, who was arrested in 2003.
“I tried to put a defector interview into the opening of each chapter,” Pillsbury said, noting that the defectors remain in witness protection programs and “fear for their lives” due to the possibility of Chinese retaliation.
The defectors disclosed details of “what China is trying to do to America in what they call the 100-year marathon,” he said.
On the Chinese hawks, Pillsbury said internal writings of these powerful political and military leaders revealed “how they draw lessons from China’s ancient past … and how can they surpass America without the Americans reacting.”
Pillsbury, whose most senior government post was assistant undersecretary of defense for policy planning in the administration of President Ronald Reagan, also worked for several senators and has been a consultant on China policy for decades.
In the book, Pillsbury acknowledged that initially he was among the staunchest advocates of the U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” toward China launched initially in 1969 as a way to prevent a Soviet takeover in Beijing.
Asked when he abandoned his pro-China, “panda hugger” views, he said: “Over time … mainly after Tiananmen”—a reference to the brutal 1989 military crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing’s main square.
“We believed that American aid to a fragile China whose leaders thought like us would help China become a democratic and peaceful power without ambitions of regional or even global dominance,” Pillsbury wrote.
“Every one of the assumptions behind that belief was wrong—dangerously so,” he stated, noting that the power of China’s now dominant faction of anti-American ultranationalists was underestimated.
Pillsbury’s book, The Hundred Year Marathon, reveals new details of secret CIA cooperation with China in covert action programs in Afghanistan and Angola, as well as nearly $1 billion worth of weapons transfers during the 1980s.
The covert support for China, along with a continuing flow of U.S. technology and intelligence for the past 45 years, were once among the U.S. government’s most closely guarded secrets.
The book also declassifies details of several presidential memoranda behind the covert U.S. policy of supporting China that Pillsbury states produced one of the United States’ most significant strategic blunders.
Documents and intelligence reports smuggled out of China after the bloody Tiananmen massacre, when tanks were called in to disperse tens of thousands of unarmed pro-democracy protesters, revealed that senior Chinese leaders were sharply divided over supporting the students’ calls for democratic political reform, according to the book.
Communist super hawks in the military and senior Party leadership managed to defeat and ultimately arrest senior Party officials who supported the pro-democracy reform.
The book also provides the following new disclosures on China’s strategy toward the United States:
• Chinese hardliners promoted the book of Col. Liu Mingfu, “The China Dream” that is the inspiration behind current Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s increasingly Maoist policies. Other writings by hawks reveal a future China-dominated world will that values “order over freedom, ethics over law and elite governance over democracy and human rights.”
• U.S. intelligence agencies for decades underestimated the influence of Chinese hawks and continue to dismiss their power and influence as “fringe” elements.
• Intelligence assessments in the late 1980s failed to recognize the pro-democracy sentiment inside the ruling Politburo was strong until it was crushed after the 1989 crackdown on dissent.
• After Tiananmen, China’s government created a false history to hide its past covert cooperation with the United States.
• China’s “assassin’s mace” weapons—missiles and other exotic arms—are being built to defeat satellites and knock out aircraft carriers, using high-tech arms, including electromagnetic pulse weapons.
• As part of covert U.S. offers of assistance to China in the 1970s, the CIA cut off aid to the exiled Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama and canceled U.S. Navy patrols through the Taiwan Strait. Instead, the CIA began providing intelligence on the Soviet Union to China.
• Reagan agreed to sell six major weapons systems to China but required that continued aid be conditioned on China remaining unaligned with Moscow and liberalizing its communist system. The arms transfers were halted after Tiananmen.
• World Bank assistance to China imposed no conditions on China moving toward free market reforms. As a result, China’s government today continues to control most industries.
• China will undermine the United Nations and World Trade Organization to “delegitimize” the U.S.-led world order in order to promote its global system.
• An internal secret briefing for Chinese officials discussed China’s most important foreign policy priority as “how to manage the decline of the United States,” revealing that China is working against U.S. interests in supporting rogue states and selling arms to America’s enemies.
To counter what Pillsbury describes as China’s “warring states era” strategy for world dominance, an approach that outlines how a lesser power can defeat a stronger foe, the United States needs to recognize the threat and take urgent steps to prevent China from dominating the world.
Pillsbury said that as part of efforts to counter the Chinese military buildup, the Pentagon’s next budget will include funding for up to 100 new long-range bombers, funds for hardening U.S. satellites against Chinese attacks, and money for a Navy program to protect U.S. aircraft carriers from China’s carrier-killing DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.
附錄三
“Panda Hugger Turned Slugger”
By HOWARD W. FRENCH
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Feb. 26, 2015
---For years, Pillsbury’s view fit the Washington consensus: China, with the help of the U.S., would become a peaceful power. No longer.
During the first half of his long career in defense and intelligence, Michael Pillsbury was what he now calls a “panda hugger.” He took a consistently positive view of China’s future and of the payoff awaiting the United States for assisting in its emergence—an outlook that fit comfortably within the longtime Washington consensus. He writes in “The Hundred-Year Marathon”: “We believed that American aid to a fragile China whose leaders thought like us would help China become a democratic and peaceful power without ambitions of regional or even global dominance.”
No longer. “Looking back,” Mr. Pillsbury concludes, “it is painful that I was so gullible.”
Mr. Pillsbury, who was the assistant under secretary of defense for policy planning during the Reagan administration, has been evolving in a sharply different direction since the 1990s, when Chinese politics turned strongly nationalistic after the Tiananmen Square incident. In time, he became one of the most ardent and sometimes shrill messengers about the threat China poses to the U.S. “The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower” is a book that thrums with a convert’s passion. What’s shocking for Mr. Pillsbury is the discovery that China’s ambition to become the world’s dominant power has been there all along, virtually burned into the country’s cultural DNA and hiding, as he says, in plain sight.
For most of recorded history, China had the world’s richest economy and boasted both hugely inventive technology and extraordinary cultural attainment. Its ideal, moreover, was supremacy over tianxia, or “everything under heaven” in imperial-era parlance, within a tribute-based international system.
This world was punctured, of course, in the 19th century with the imposition of European imperialism throughout Asia. But it took scarcely a decade in power for Mao Zedong to exhibit his civilization’s brash assertiveness, fighting the United States to a standstill in Korea, setting a short-term goal of economically surpassing Britain—however disastrously—and staring down his erstwhile patron, the Soviet Union.
In Mr. Pillsbury’s telling, the U.S. allowed itself to be utterly fooled by the man who replaced Mao, Deng Xiaoping, who seduced the Americans into training thousands of Chinese scientists in American universities during the Carter years in what he calls “the greatest outpouring of American scientific and technological expertise in history.” This was followed, under Presidents Reagan and Bush, by the military and intelligence cooperation that Mr. Pillsbury advocated, including providing China with detailed information about its main adversaries at the time, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and ending the longstanding U.S. economic embargo. The grandfatherly Deng supposedly accomplished this through his pragmatic sensibility and earthy charm, which won him a place on Time magazine covers—as well as in the hearts of capitalists—with dreams of an immense, untapped Chinese market.
For years after Deng, the saying “hide your brilliance and bide your time,” attributed to the former “paramount leader,” served as soothing reassurance to many Western observers of China.
Somehow this was interpreted among Washington types, including the author, to mean that China saw no urgency in challenging the West and indeed might never do so.
Now the author sees that Deng’s dictum was a summons to self-discipline and cunning, aimed at helping China overcome anything standing on its path to restored pre-eminence. The saying, Mr. Pillsbury informs us, dates from a corpus of literature on statecraft from the first millennium B.C., when rival Chinese states prized deception above all as they jockeyed for supremacy. Over and over Mr. Pillsbury, who emphasizes his fluency in Mandarin and his ability to read and write the language, draws on abundant contemporary references to this era’s writing to argue that China sees today’s “multipolar world as merely a strategic waypoint en route to a new global hierarchy.”
At the heart of the strategy is an effort to “kill with a borrowed sword,” which means tapping the strength of an adversary for eventual use against it. Mr. Pillsbury cites warnings about such an approach that Washington received from Soviet defectors in the early 1960s, just as Beijing and Moscow were beginning their stormy divorce. Because of Mao’s impatience, the Chinese supposedly tipped their hand far too early, squandering the opportunity to drain the Soviets of more cheap resources and technology. Under its new leader, Xi Jinping , Beijing has been very assertive, but Mr. Pillsbury warns that it is nonetheless determined to keep Washington lulled until it has made off with everything valuable it can siphon from this open society and the international order it supports.
The U.S. is vulnerable to this strategy, Mr. Pillsbury says, because it has chronically underestimated the hawks lurking in the Chinese establishment. Even worse, he adds, we have no understanding of China’s strategic culture. One is tempted to concede point one, but this second assertion is simply not true. The Pentagon, academia and American think tanks have no shortage of specialists in China’s strategic culture, from Alastair Iain Johnston and Roger Ames to M. Taylor Fravel.
The author is correct to assert that China constitutes, by far, the biggest national challenge to America’s position in the world today, but its smug belief in the idea that it has mastered all the essentials of statecraft based on its own ritualized wars of 2,500 years ago is a poor reason for Americans to develop a complex. To the extent that it is true, it may even be to our advantage.
Mr. French teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. He is the author of “China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa.”
